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Natural language processing (NLP) methods
for analyzing legal text offer legal scholars
and practitioners a range of tools allowing
to empirically analyze law on a large scale.
However, researchers seem to struggle when
it comes to identifying ethical limits to using
NLP systems for acquiring genuine insights
both about the law and the systems’ predictive
capacity. In this paper we set out a number
of ways in which to think systematically about
such issues. We place emphasis on three cru-
cial normative parameters which have, to the
best of our knowledge, been underestimated
by current debates: (a) the importance of aca-
demic freedom, (b) the existence of a wide di-
versity of legal and ethical norms domestically
but even more so internationally and (c) the
threat of moralism in research related to com-
putational law. For each of these three parame-
ters we provide specific recommendations for
the legal NLP community. Our discussion is
structured around the study of a real-life sce-
nario that has prompted recent debate in the
legal NLP research community.
1 Introduction
Developing computational methods for analyzing
legal text is an emerging area in natural language
processing (NLP) with various applications such as
legal topic classification (Nallapati and Manning,
2008), court opinion generation (Ye et al., 2018)
and legal judgment prediction (Aletras et al., 2016;
Luo et al., 2017; Zhong et al., 2018; Chalkidis et al.,
2019). Legal NLP holds the promise of improving
access to justice and offers to legal scholars the
tools that allow for an empirical analysis of law on
a large scale (Katz, 2012; Zhong et al., 2020).
The development and use of legal text processing
technologies also raise a series of ethical questions,
on which we focus in this paper. For example,
following the publication at EMNLP 2019 of a
paper on automatic prison term prediction (Chen
et al., 2019) using a dataset constructed from pub-
lished and publicly available records of past cases
of the Supreme People’s Court of China, a debate
ensued about the ethical limits of legal NLP. More
specifically, Leins et al. (2020) queried in a system-
atic way whether papers such as that of Chen et al.
(2019) should be published. Leins et al. (2020)
invoked a number of arguments including consid-
erations to do with the construction of the dataset
(Bender and Friedman, 2018), and so-called ‘dual
use’ arguments (Radford et al., 2019), i.e. the possi-
bility of using a system developed for some purpose
for another, potentially harmful, purpose. Follow-
ing a rich discussion, Leins et al. (2020) asked
whether it is ethically permissible that legal NLP
should be used at all to predict items such as prison
terms.
We believe that the kind of ethical query put
forth by Leins et al. (2020) is vital for the future
of legal NLP and computational law in general.
However, we also contend that it is essential that a
more general discussion should be conducted about
the pertinent normative principles and concepts at
play. References to more general principles can
often curb the temptation to make decisions on the
basis of ad hoc moral intuitions which might not
be and probably are not, as we explain later on,
universally shared. The contributions of this paper
are as follows:
• In this paper we make no claim to cover all
the ethical ground in a comprehensive way.
Instead, we focus on three crucial ethical pa-
rameters that, to the best of our knowledge,
have not been extensively debated so far: (a)
the role of academic freedom (§2); (b) the ex-
istence of a wide diversity of legal and ethical
norms applicable to or endorsed by the global























threat of moralism in legal NLP research (§4);
• We illustrate the practical difference that the
first two factors would make, when taken into
account, on the basis of the study of real-case
scenarios of developing or using legal NLP
technology;
• Moreover, for each of the three normative pa-
rameters (i.e. academic freedom, norms di-
versity and moralism), we provide specific
recommendations for the legal NLP commu-
nity.
2 Academic Freedom
2.1 What is academic freedom?
The idea of academic freedom has a long and impor-
tant pedigree in the history of the Western univer-
sity (Newman, 1976; Searle, 1972). Still, despite
the importance of the idea, there is currently no
commonly accepted definition accepted across do-
mestic jurisdictions and scholars (Barendt, 2010).
Be that as it may, for the purposes of this paper
we provide the following working definition: aca-
demic freedom is the freedom of scholars, whether
employed by universities or not, to decide without
undue external pressure or coercion the topics of
their research, the standards of such research and
the application of such standards to the scholars’
peers.
Academic freedom is both similar to and dif-
ferent from the more general right to freedom of
speech (Barendt, 2010). It is similar in that it in-
volves communicating freely chosen and conducted
research to pertinent audiences. It is different in
that: (a) it also applies to non-expressive research
activities; (b) it is more circumscribed because
scholars are bound by certain professional stan-
dards; and (c) it has both an individual-rights di-
mension and an institutional dimension, both being
bound to the idea of the university as an intellec-
tual space of free and uncoerced pursuit of truth.
Academic freedom is recognized as a distinctive
right by a number of national constitutions, such
as Article 5(3) of the German Basic Law, as well
as by some transnational legal instruments, such
as Article 13 of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
2.2 What is the value of academic freedom?
Two different tacks could be taken. First, one could
provide a consequentialist argument. Consequen-
tialist arguments identify right and wrong actions
solely on the basis of their good or bad conse-
quences (Driver, 2012). Accordingly, academic
freedom could be justified by invoking the benefi-
cial results of research undertaken, conducted and
debated freely by researchers.
Second, one could opt for a deontological ar-
gument. Deontological ethical arguments identify
permissible actions on the basis of (absolute) rules
and irrespective of the consequences that actions
may bring about (Alexander and Moore, 2007).
Under a deontological construal, the guarantees of
academic freedom would not be justified solely by
the (expected) outcomes of the research actions
they would allow but also: (a) because the pursuit
of truth and knowledge for their own sake is a good
in itself and irrespective of whether its (expected)
consequences are good or bad (under some crite-
rion of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’); and (b) because
preserving academic freedom also preserves the
integrity and inviolability of the very person of the
researcher (Nagel, 1995).
We hasten to add for the sake of completeness
that one could perhaps also opt for a virtue eth-
ical approach to academic freedom (Hursthouse
and Pettigrove, 2018). We refrain from doing so
in this paper because, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no comprehensive literature on a virtue ethics
approach to academic freedom exists. Therefore,
whatever the merits of such an approach, it falls
outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on
more entrenched within the pertinent research com-
munity ethical parameters.
2.3 Academic freedom and legal NLP
One first thing to note is that, despite its impor-
tance, academic freedom does not seem to be rec-
ognized as a distinctive ethical value in many codes
related to the community of computer science re-
searchers. For example, the ACM Code of Ethics
refrains from specifically referring to that freedom
in its first section, which is devoted to ‘General
Ethical Principles’.1 While explaining this gap is
beyond the scope of the present paper, we contend
that academic freedom should be taken as seriously
as the other ethical principles and values invoked
therein, especially if one is to accept, as we think
one should, that academic freedom’s scope of ap-
plication does not just include the ‘academia’ in the
1ACM Code of Ethics – https://www.acm.org/co
de-of-ethics
narrow institutional sense (i.e. universities or other
kinds of tertiary education institutions) but virtually
anyone who engages in research and scholarship
with a view to descovering the truth about a subject
matter.
If we begin with the widespread assumption that
academic freedom is indeed a fundamental right,
certain things seem to follow. First, in the assess-
ment of the ethics of legal NLP, academic freedom
will have to be taken into due account and then
balanced against other values, such as the value of
privacy of data subjects or the value or disvalue
of certain further potential applications of systems
(e.g. for legal judgment prediction) than those for
which they were initially developed (‘dual-use’).
When values are balanced against each other, the
all-things-considered permissibility of taking an ac-
tion (in our case proceeding with a research project
or publishing a paper in legal NLP) ultimately de-
pends on taking all relevant contextual factors into
account. We thus contend that there is no auto-
matic general rule to apply to all cases. Still, we
believe that, for example, in most imaginable sce-
narios where there is minimal interference with
the rights of data subjects insofar as data such as
court judgments are harvested from the public do-
main, pursuing an otherwise cognitively valuable
research project should be permitted. More gener-
ally, taking academic freedom seriously renders the
ethical permissibility of legal NLP projects more
complex than sometimes acknowledged, since aca-
demic freedom will have to be taken seriously into
account as an independent ethical factor, something
which rarely (if ever) seems to happen as things
currently stand, and despite the fact that almost all
researchers pledge some kind of commitment to
some version of academic freedom.
Second, and more importantly, ethical assess-
ments of legal NLP research will also depend on the
particular interpretation of the value of academic
freedom (Barendt, 2010). For example, deontolog-
ical interpretations of that value radically circum-
scribe the permissibility of invoking certain kinds
of consequentialist reasons to block particular types
of legal NLP research (Waldron, 2000). Invoking
such reasons, we contend, is a direct violation of
the integrity and equal freedom of researchers in
the same way that, say, invoking people’s tendency
to be offended by certain kinds of artistic creations
(for example, ‘blasphemous’ art) to block dissemi-
nation of art is a violation of the dignity of the artist.
At the very least, under a robust understanding of
the right to academic freedom (Dworkin, 1977),
arguments to the effect that a certain piece of legal
NLP research will have ‘bad’ consequences (what-
ever these are) will not be enough unless the risk
of the consequences actually (as opposed to merely
speculatively) obtaining is clear, present and sig-
nificant. Again, we stress that there is no easily
applicable general ethical rule here. Researchers
should apply their ethical judgment in a contextual
way by trying to account for all the relevant factors.
We provide in the discussion that follows a concrete
illustration of what a deontological understanding
of academic freedom might entail in a particular
scenario.
We also argue that even consequentialist interpre-
tations of the value of academic freedom will place
emphasis on the benefits of allowing researchers,
at least prima facie, to freely conduct research,
even when such research is ethically controversial.
These benefits consist, among other things, in the
possibility of maximizing the chances of getting
to the truth about a certain subject-matter (in our
case, law) through the proliferation of different
research perspectives, thus promoting the public
good.2 Moreover, in this case again, the merely
speculative possibility of certain adverse effects ob-
taining (e.g. systems designed by the researchers
being used by others to pursue unethical goals) is
not enough to render such research unethical in
itself. There must be a real probability, not just a
theoretical possibility, that these effects might in
fact materialize.
2.4 Specific scenarios
These points can be readily illustrated by reference
to the article by Leins et al. (2020) with which we
began our discussion. We have said that, at the very
least, academic freedom should be taken into ac-
count as an independent ethical value. We contend
that this would modify significantly at least the
structure of the argument provided by Leins et al.
(2020). We stress, of course, that this in no way
implies that academic freedom ‘wins by default’.
In fact, we have already highlighted that academic
freedom is not the only pertinent ethical value and
we have stressed that we do not believe that a gen-
erally applicable rule exists. All we intend to do is
to argue that academic freedom as such should be
2ACM Code of Ethics – https://www.acm.org/co
de-of-ethics#h-1.2-avoid-harm
taken seriously into account and balanced against
other pertinent ethical factors. However, we think
that in the context of the particular case under con-
sideration, academic freedom tips the balance in
favor of the ethical permissibility of the research
by Chen et al. (2019). Thus, the ‘dual-use’ and
‘dataset construction’ concerns voiced by Leins
et al. (2020) will not be sufficient on their own
to call the shots in ethics assessment in favor of
rejecting either conducting or publishing the scruti-
nized research for the following reasons.
Dual-use Regarding the ‘dual-use’ concerns, we
think that Leins et al. (2020) overestimate the dan-
gers of an algorithm designed by academics be-
ing used to decide real cases with adverse conse-
quences for real people. In particular, Leins et al.
(2020) provide no reason to worry that any such
use might happen anytime soon, nor evidence that
there is, for example, a serious standing intention
on the part of Chinese authorities to implement
what would amount to a radical reform of the ju-
dicial system. Accordingly, the chance of an ethi-
cally unacceptable use of the designed algorithm
seems, on the face of it, rather small (not to say
almost completely theoretical). If this should be
accepted, then both deontological and consequen-
tialist interpretations of academic freedom tip the
balance in favor of conducting and publishing the
scrutinized research. Deontological interpretations
place a very high premium on curtailments of the
freedom and dignity of researchers. Arguably, this
premium is not met by just the theoretical possibil-
ity of some bad consequence eventually resulting
somewhere downstream from the research. But
even consequentialist interpretations of academic
freedom would concur in the case at point. This is
because the expected probability of the occurrence
of the bad consequences highlighted in the paper
by Leins et al. (2020) (use of a potentially biased
algorithm by the judiciary to help make inequitable
decisions) seems in this case particularly low (or
perhaps even nonexistent).
Of course, we fully acknowledge that we might
be wrong in our assessment about the probability
of a potentially evil ‘dual-use’; we are in no way
experts about Chinese legal and political affairs or
of impending developments in the Chinese legal
system. Still, the reasoning we have outlined also
has a dimension to do with accruing and assessing
evidence for ethical assessment. Thus, we hold
that, in cases of doubt or where adequate evidence
is neither available nor forthcoming, the value of
academic freedom grounds at least a presumption
in favor of proceeding with the research, the burden
of proof in ‘dual-use’ scenarios been shifted to
those who believe that there is a serious reason not
to undertake a given piece of research. It is crucial
for academic freedom that this burden should not
be met by the researchers themselves. Arguably, in
the case at hand the evidential burden has not been
met by Leins et al. (2020).
Dataset Construction Similar considerations
apply when it comes to assessing concerns to do
with the construction of any particular dataset for
legal NLP. The argument put forth by Leins et al.
(2020) stresses that the dataset exposes people to
harm because the defendants of past cases are iden-
tifiable. But arguably the probability of exposing
people to harm through the construction of a dataset
consisting of already decided cases by some domes-
tic Supreme Court seems so low as to be practically
non-existent. On the one hand, Leins et al. (2020)
do not provide any evidence in favor of their ar-
gument. On the other hand, and to the best of our
knowledge, the probability of these cases reopening
together with that of some judge being specifically
influenced by the dataset if such reopening occurs
is practically non-existent. In all jurisdictions that
we know about, cases by courts at the top of the
judicial hierarchy are mostly, even if not uniquely,
to do with the past, since by definition Supreme
Courts issue the final judgment on some case. Thus,
in order for considerations of potential harm to de-
fendants to trump academic freedom, the risk of
harm must be real, even under a generous under-
standing of the latter term, not merely imaginary or
speculative. We stress, moreover, that this kind of
understanding of harm coheres well with the ACM
Code of Ethics that we have already cited. Thus,
here again academic freedom, under any reason-
able interpretation, should normally tip the balance
in favor of proceeding with the research.
In a similar way, contending that some dataset
‘unfairly advantages or disadvantages’, as Leins
et al. (2020) claim, appears to hugely overstate the
real degree to which academic research might im-
pact on the actual workings of judicial and political
institutions. This is even more the case with respect
to the specific dataset in question, since the latter
was created by using documents already available
in the public domain. In fact, it is the availabil-
ity of the documents in the public domain itself,
for which researchers bear no ethical responsibil-
ity, that creates certain risks to data subjects, if at
all. Furthermore, such a contention bypasses the
obvious fact that the dataset merely indicates the
existence of unfair treatment that happened, if it
did, at the level of what some Supreme Court did
and not at the level of converting the activity of this
Court into a dataset.
Last, but not least, here again the cases refer
to facts that have already happened and no details
are provided in Leins et al. (2020) as to whether
there is, within the Chinese legal and social order,
a concrete and standing threat for individuals to be
unfairly treated on the basis of past cases (whether
these led to convictions or not). Thus, we repeat
that a merely theoretical or speculative possibility
should not be considered sufficient, absent other
factors, and especially concrete and real, not just
imagined, reasons to trump academic freedom.
2.5 Recommendations
In decisions about the ethics of legal NLP research,
deliberation should begin by commencing with a
(rebuttable) presumption to the effect that academic
freedom should not be curtailed lest there be com-
pelling, to wit, clear and present or at least signifi-
cantly probable (not purely theoretical or specula-
tive) reasons to decide otherwise.
3 Diversity of Ethical and Legal Norms
3.1 Norms Diversity: The general problem
The community of legal NLP researchers is now
global, ranging from the Global North to the Global
South. However, a number of ethical standards
on how to conduct legal NLP research in many
cases seem to be either local or of local origin.
Moreover, different ethical and legal standards may
be found across different jurisdictions or cultures.
Moral diversity is thus an issue that crops up in a
variety of contexts to do with legal NLP. Below, we
shall concentrate on the specific issue of privacy
and data protection in the construction of datasets.
Still, similar issues could also arise in other areas,
such as the definition of what counts as ‘unfairness’
towards a specific group.
Privileging a particular ethical or legal standard
over another (or a particular interpretation of a com-
mon standard) could fuel the suspicion that, instead
of reflecting a perspective of detached and ‘pure
rationality’, such standards and interpretations are
in fact just entrenching local (and, for that mat-
ter, Western European or, more generally, Global
Northern) prejudices and preconceptions, impos-
ing them as mandatory norms on researchers who
might not reflectively endorse them. There are two
distinct but interrelated issues here. First, as a mat-
ter of fact, there appears to be a wide diversity
of ethical standards that are accepted by different
communities, with some of them being endorsed by
some and rejected by others and vice versa (Prinz,
2007). Second, even when ethical or legal stan-
dards are shared across communities, there is often
more or less widespread and reasonable disagree-
ment about their ‘best’ or ‘proper’ interpretation
(Gowans, 2015).
Now, the above facts do not immediately lead
to what might seem like an unacceptable ethical
relativism, i.e. the idea that no universal valid ethi-
cal standards could ever exist (Gowans, 2015). A
discussion about the merits of ethical relativism is
outside the scope of this paper, and we wish neither
to endorse nor to criticize it. Our only point here
is that, irrespective of the stand one takes on the
issue of ethical relativism, the reality of diversity
of ethical and legal opinion gives rise to an issue
that cannot be avoided, to wit, the kind of position
that researchers may take when confronted with
research based on ethical rules and norms that sig-
nificantly diverge from their own. Thus, ethical
diversity points to the need to submit the content
of the researcher’s own standards, especially when
they are used to evaluate the research of scholars
who do not necessarily endorse them or reside in
parts of the globe where they are considered nei-
ther legally nor perhaps even morally binding, to
a much more searching examination. Accordingly,
it should not be taken for granted that, say, histor-
ically and geographically contingent conceptions
of a particular concept (e.g. data privacy in the EU,
or the ban of judge analytics in France3) should al-
ways and without further argument take normative
priority in ethical assessments.
Like in the previous section on academic free-
dom, we hasten to add that this does not amount
to an easily applicable rule or ‘formula’ (which in
our case could be either ‘pay no heed to alien rules
and norms and stick to what you think is right’ or
its exact opposite such as ‘accept diversity no mat-
ter how unethical the alien rules or norms appear




any easy, uncontroversial and unequivocal way by
which to resolve such ethically complicated issues.
As everywhere in life, a lot will depend on the
particulars of each case and on the researcher’s ca-
pacity to manifest a sensitivity to these particulars
and of the specific ways in which they mesh in each
scenario. All that we are suggesting is that issues
to do with diversity of ethical and legal outlooks
should be brought to the attention of researchers
and, in the end, may only be resolved by the ex-
ercise of contextual and inherently controversial
ethical judgment. At the very least, the actual pres-
ence of a diversity of different outlooks requires a
willingness to engage seriously with ’alien’ rules
and norms, trying to understand their point and jus-
tification from the other’s point of view, instead of
easily and sometimes even complacently dismiss-
ing them out of hand as straightforwardly unethical.
3.2 Specific Scenario
To better apprehend how such a relatively abstract
discussion may play out in a particular context
and scenario, let us once again revisit the initial
example with which we began our discussion, i.e.
the paper by Leins et al. (2020).
Data Privacy: The ethical factors at play A
large part of the argument put forth by Leins et al.
(2020) consists in querying the process of construc-
tion of the dataset used by Chen et al. (2019) by
invoking the rights of data subjects to privacy (sim-
ilarly, Aletras et al. (2016), Chalkidis et al. (2019),
Chalkidis et al. (2020) and Chalkidis et al. (2021)
use publicly available data that contain private in-
formation in the context of the European Court of
Human Rights). Thus, Leins et al. (2020) raise
issues to do with the use of ‘sensitive and confi-
dential data’, such as data to do with prison time
served. They also refer to the fact that the people
represented in the dataset do not seem to have been
informed about data collection. The question then
is whether these research practices are ethically
problematic. While it seems self-evident, at least
for a researcher accustomed to the practices of late
twentieth century European states, to answer in
the affirmative, an issue that Leins et al. (2020) do
not address is that any answer to this question will
presuppose a particular prior understanding of the
content of the right of data subjects to privacy, an
understanding, moreover, that may only be avail-
able to certain kinds of legal and ethical cultures
and not to others.
The discussion may progress by reference to
the simple observation that, when it comes to the
legal and ethical status of datasets composed of
data already available in the public domain (such
as those in the papers by Chen et al. (2019) and
Chalkidis et al. (2019)), there appears to be no
global universal consensus as to the scope of the
privacy rights of the data subjects involved.4 A few
jurisdictions deploy very demanding definitions
of data privacy, coupled with special protection
provided with respect to ’sensitive data’: the EU
and Australia are prime examples. Still, there also
exist major divergences between state practices,
some states being much more permissive in those
respects than others.
The invocation of privacy as an ethical consider-
ation thus raises a distinctive problem: how should
privacy be understood in view of the fact that there
is no universal consensus on its nature and its pro-
tection across states? Should particular definitions
of data privacy constitute the appropriate normative
benchmark? And why? As we have already said,
some of these definitions might be significantly
more demanding than others, reflecting different
local conventions about the value of rights that data
subjects have under the law.
We contend that the documented divergences in
the attitudes towards data protection and the right to
privacy, differences reflected in the law of different
jurisdictions, in fact stem from a more fundamental
phenomenon, i.e. the diversity of ethical, moral and
legal outlooks both across time and across states,
cultures and peoples. (Prinz, 2007). In fact, as
we have already shown, it is arguable that the high
standard of data protection that Leins et al. (2020)
use, which also appears to be the standard used by
the ACM Code of Ethics5 is in the minority from a
global point of view (Renteln, 1988). Moreover, the
construction of datasets from databases containing
publicly available court judgments appears to at
least count in favor of the prima facie permissibility
of that research practice.
The availability of court judgments in the public
domain even in core Western countries that oth-
erwise protect private data in other domains and
with respect to international courts such as the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights still belies an older
conception of privacy: one in which the publicity




the individual’s wish to hide oneself from others
in public space (Langford, 2009). Under this older
conception of privacy, not only is it possible to
retrieve the names of litigants in past cases, but
also that possibility is protective of the rule of law
in the same way that, say, secret trials of terrorist
or other suspects are still widely thought to under-
mine it (Resnik, 2011). The above comments thus
suffice to show that the high standard of privacy
protection that is sometimes used to scrutinize re-
search practices in legal NLP, exemplified by Leins
et al. (2020), is not only geographically but also
historically contingent.
Under these conditions, the following question
becomes ethically pressing: Why should any local
and geographically restricted conception of stricter
data privacy and protection be preferred to, say,
a more relaxed and minimal one? Granted, re-
searchers conducting legal NLP research in loca-
tions where that particular conception is prevalent
and legally obligatory, such as the European Union
or Australia, should of course abide by it; but why
should other researchers, such as those residing,
say, in Singapore, the United States or Africa, be
held to that same particularly demanding standard?
Moreover, is it even fair and ethical, given what
was already stated above with respect to academic
freedom, to hold researchers (e.g. non-European
and non-Australian) to a peculiarly local, and by
no means universally acknowledged, standard?
Data Privacy: Application to the case at hand
On the basis of the above considerations, we be-
lieve that this kind of contextually informed think-
ing could argue in favor of the ethical acceptabil-
ity of the research practices used by Chen et al.
(2019) in the construction of their dataset. There
are two important variables at play here. On the
one hand, the data is already in the public domain.
Under these circumstances, the interference of the
researchers with the data subjects’ rights appears
minimal at worst: in fact, even under a demanding
definition of privacy, the main interference with pri-
vacy rights is due to the availability of the publicly
available database itself and not to the researcher’s
activity of constructing a dataset for research pur-
poses out of it. But, second, we could even go
further and ask why what appears like a specifi-
cally European definition of privacy and data pro-
tection, and moreover one which, at least as things
stand nowadays seems to be more of an outlier on
a global level, should be adopted as a normative
yardstick by researchers working in a completely
different ethical and regulatory environment.
As we have already said, there is a long and ven-
erable Western and European tradition which lays
stress on the importance of the publicity of court
judgments. For a long time, it was considered not
unethical but utterly normal to make court trials
and their outcomes public, so as to control through
public scrutiny the exercise of state coercion on
individuals. While this consideration might now
seem dated in some parts of the world, especially
those that have entrenched traditions of judicial in-
dependence and a high degree of trust to the judicial
system, we should be sensitive to its importance in
other parts of the world. It thus becomes difficult
to resist the conclusion that the absence of respect
of (putatively European) data protection norms by
Chen et al. (2019)) is not a fatal ethical objection
to either conducting or publishing their research.
3.3 Recommendations
Forging genuine universal ethical standards re-
quires a global conversation between researchers
engaged from a plurality of standpoints and tradi-
tions. When such standards do not exist or exist
only to a minimal degree, ethical assessment for
global conferences, journals and reviews should
be appropriately flexible and respectful of differ-
ences and reasonable disagreements. No automatic
assumptions should be made that a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ model is sufficient to make informed decisions
about the ethical status of research practices.
4 The Threat of Moralism in Legal NLP
We believe that the previous discussion points to a
more general issue, that we treat under the heading
of the ‘threat of moralism’ in legal NLP. While this
issue is more theoretical than the previous ones
(which had practical ramifications), we think it
should be treated on its own, insofar as it allows
us to propose a more general and comprehensive
conceptual framework that allows us to make wider
sense of the ethical issues at play. This section of
our paper thus has the function of both subsuming
the previous discussion and further advancing it,
albeit without this time focusing on the discussion
of a specific scenario.
4.1 How to characterize moralism?
Moralism can be intuitively understood as ‘the vice
of overdoing morality’ (Coady, 2015). In the con-
text of qualitative research, Hammersley and Tra-
ianou (2011) has contended that moralism can take
two different forms. First, it might involve the be-
lief that substantive ethical values, other than the
disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake,
should be integral goals of research. Second, it
might involve the requirement that researchers ad-
here to ‘high’ or even the ‘highest possible’ ethical
standards (Hammersley and Traianou, 2011).
Here, and with no ambition of a comprehen-
sive discussion, we roughly define moralism as the
idea that substantive moral values and constraints
more demanding than mere adherence to valid legal
norms or to relatively uncontroversial and in any
event minimal ethical norms, such as the require-
ment not to harm others, must be taken into account
when assessing research outputs, including legal
NLP research. Our argument is that moralism of
this sort threatens academic freedom and the equal
dignity of researchers as bearers of such freedom.
4.2 Why moralism might be a problem in
legal NLP?
To think clearly about why moralism in the sense
of the pursuit of substantive moral values might be
a problem in legal NLP, we might make an anal-
ogy with moralism in the setting of ordinary social
and political life. At least liberal democracies take
seriously John Stuart Mill’s idea (Mill, 2015) that
people should be free to pursue various ends that
they themselves set, so long as they keep within
certain reasonable limits circumscribed by the so-
called ‘harm’ principle, i.e. the requirement not to
harm others equally engaged in the pursuit of their
proper ends.
A political community that attempts to impose
substantive ends on individuals, say on the assump-
tion that certain forms of life are ‘higher’ or ‘more
important’ than others is guilty of disrespecting
the autonomy of individuals. We contend that,
in an analogous way, a research community that
attempts to instill in its members specific ethical
ends other than the disinterested pursuit of truth
and knowledge, especially by ethically assessing
the very content of research endeavors, is risking
falling into a kind of moralism which fails to take
the freedom of researchers seriously. In particular,
the mere fact that certain members of the research
community subjectively find a piece of research
to be unacceptable on other than professionally
defined and accepted methodological grounds or
basic and flagrant disrespect of moral norms such
as the no-harm principle, should not be deemed
automatically sufficient for ethical condemnation
of the research.
4.3 Recommendations
The primary moral duty of legal NLP researchers,
like all researchers, is to the disinterested pursuit of
truth as they understand it, and not to substantive
ends which are extrinsic to that pursuit.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have contributed to the ongoing
discussion on the ethics of legal NLP (Leins et al.,
2020). We laid emphasis on three normative fac-
tors whose importance, to the best of our knowl-
edge, has not been sufficiently acknowledged, i.e.
academic freedom, diversity of ethical and legal
norms of the global NLP community and the wider
and more abstract issue of moralism in research
ethics. Moreover, we illustrated how the first two
factors might make a practical difference to ethi-
cal decision-making by a detailed discussion of a
specific scenario. We also stressed that these fac-
tors do not amount to any automatically applicable
general rule but require the exercise of contextual
ethical thinking on the part of researchers. Final
decisions should be made by taking all ethically
relevant factors into account.
We believe that the ethical factors we identi-
fied can help the legal NLP community become
more reflective and tolerant of a wider variety of
approaches whilst at the same time remaining fully
committed to the academic ideal of disinterested
pursuit of truth for its own sake.
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